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This paper examines the effects of monetary policy in an 
op디rnizing two-country model in which monopolistically 
compe디tive firms set their prices in advance. so that the prices 
are sticky 까le main findings of this paper are that there occurs 
an instantaneous depreciation of the exchange rates through a 
countercyclical response of a markup when there is a positive 
home monetary shock. The paper shows that the stic쩌， pnce 
model cannot resolve the forward premium puzzle. The degree of 
depreciation depends on the degree of price stickiness as real 
variables become more volatile with stronger price stickiness. 
Finally. the nominal exchange and real exchange rates move 
very closely as in data when there is a substantial degree of 
price rigidity 
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1. Introdluction 
In intemational finance. there is vast empiric외 literature that 
documents the failure of the flexible price general equilibrium 
model in that the forward exchange rate is not an unbiased 
predictor of the future spot exchange rate and a sizable 
time-val)끼 ng foreign exch없1ge risk premium exists. While some 
economists explain this failure as the market inefficiency. others 
make efforts to set up a gener머 equilibrium cash-in-advance 
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models 없ld explain the excessive variation of exchange rates from 
this. Unfortunately. it is not easy to construct a model that fits the 
empirical facts. Even if one follows the literature. it is hard to 
produce sufficient variation in exchange rate without excessive 
variation in the expected consump디on. In recent. Clarida and Gali 
(1 993). Eichenbaum and Evans (1 993). 밍ld Ev밍lS 밍ld Lothian 
(1993) found that the intemational transmission effects of monetaπ 
shocks are substantial. In particular. their new empirical results 
show that the expansionary monetary p이icy shocks in the US 
generate subst밍ltial. persistent depreciations in the US nominal 
and real exchange rates. They note that the effects of this monetary 
policy shocks c밍1 explain around thirty to forty percent of the 
exchange rate movements between the US ι and Germany. and the 
US and Japan. However the e외sting intemational finance models 
with f1exible prices and continuously clearing markets. albeit useful 
as benchmarks. fail to address the sluggish price and relatively 
large output adjustments by exaggerating price level variability. The 
intemational stochastic dynamic general equilibrium (SDGE) models 
in which money is introduced simply by adding cash-in-advance 
constraints or transactions role for money 뻐th f1exible prices imply 
a consumption decrease and exchange rate appreciation. Moreover. 
the more advanced intemational SDGE models in which money has 
liquidity effects through the imposi디on of portfolio or capital 
sluggishness also lack sufficient avenues for intertemporal 
propagation of monetary shocks. These models fail to account for 
long persistent effects of monetary shocks on exchange rates 
(Schlagenhauf 밍ld Wrase 1993). This leads Clarida and Gali (1993) 
to conclude that it is desirable to incorporate sluggish price 
adjustment into 야le model if one wishes to explain the 
hump-shaped short run exchange rate dynamics and the volatility 
of exchange rates. They support a stochastic rational expecta디ons 
version of the Mundell-Fleming model. 
깐lis paper extends Svensson 뻐d van W덴inbergen (1989) and 
Stockman and Ohanian (1 993) by utilizing monopolis디cally com-
pe디디ve firms with capital accumulations. Even though Clarida and 
Gali (1993) assert that the short run dy없mics of exchange rates 
are consistent with the sticky price Mundell-Fleming model. the 
approach. 려though not built on microeconomic foundation. has a 
well known series of shortcomings. 1 It ignores intertemporal 
substitution of monetary shocks which can often affect quantita디ve 
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results as argued by Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1 989). They 
propose and international “S디cky-price" monetary model built on 
monopolis디c compe디디on and cash-in-advance constraints. However. 
when they set up a model in which no capital exists and prices are 
fixed for one period to simplifY the analysis. they cannot evalua_te 
its quantitative success. Stockman and Ohanian (1993) also set up 
a “ sticky-price" dynamic op디mizaUon model. but they do not prove 
the impliications of their model with actual data because they treat 
“price-stickiness" as a black box. 
Recent attempts to reconcile RBS (Real Business Cycle) models 
with New Keynesian Macroeconomics is attractive. because t::1e 
“stic셰r-price" dynamic gener외 equilibrium model can be quantita-
tively evaluated. 1\vo models that show the importance of monetary 
policy in generating a business cycle are notable. Hairault and 
Portier (1993) assert that a dynamic extension of the Blanchard 
and Kiyotaki (1987) model with two independent shocks (real and 
monetary shocks) can answer some empirical puzzles that were 
unexplained by the traditional RE‘C models. given some adjustment 
costs in price setting. Yun (1994) also shows that a dynamic 
version of the Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1 987) model with cash 
in-advance constraints can generate a posi디ve comovement of 
inflation and output. This comovement is impossible in the RBC 
model with flexible price. such as Cooley and Hansen (1989). 
1 begin by setting up a “ sticky-price" dynamic general equilibrium 
model with monopolistic compe디tion in a standard RBC framework. 
Then u딩ing this improved model, 1 inves디gate the following 
question딩. First. 1 explore whether this model can generate a long 
and persistent hump-shaped exchange rate effect of monetaπ 
shocks. Second , 1 discuss whether this model can give rise to 
volatile exchange rate movements. Third. 1 Explore whether the 
comovements of exchange rates and other real variables are 
consistent in data. 
The propaga디on mechanism as well as the implications contained 
in such a monopolistic compe디디on model are different from those 
of the recent differential participation model such as Grilli and 
Roubini (1992). and Schlagenhauf and Wrase (1 993). The latter is 
based on liquidity effects of monetaη policy. Success of the 
sluggish portfolio or capital models is highly dependent on the 
I See Svensson and v없1 Wihnbergen (1 989). 
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genera디on of depreciation effects from positive monetary shocks 
through liquidity effects. This models. however. are inconsistent 
With the data in that the monetary policy shock effects on 
exch없1ge rates disappear after 1 or 2 quaπers. These effects are 
not present in my model. It does generate long and persistent 
depreciation effects of expansionary monetary p이icy shocks which 
are consistent With the data. Another point of comparison is the 
propaga디on mechanism. They are usually different from those of 
the slu잃ish portfolio or capi때 models With f1exible price. My 
model does not rely on the liquidity effect. But it does depend on 
the countercyclic려 response of markups 삼lrough price ri멍dity 
which generate persistent depreciation effects. That is. the markup 
which is the ratio of price to margin외 cost responds nega디vely to a 
posi디ve monetary shock as p디ce is s디cky and margin외 cost is 
f1exible in the model. The degree of markup and real variables 
become stronger as the degree of price stickiness increases. 
The main fin띠ngs of this paper c하1 be summarized as follows. 
First. when there exists a subst밍띠al degree of price rigidity in the 
economy. expansionary monetary shocks to the home countIγ lead 
to an instantaneous depreciation of home real and nominal 
exchange rates. The result that the effects of monetary shocks on 
the exchange rates last long enough is in sharp contrast With 
Schlagenhauf and Wrase (1993)’s result which emphasizes the 
liquidity effects but fails to find such effects of monetary shocks. 
However. the s디C함 price model cannot resolve the so-called 
forward premium puzzle. Second. the degree of exchange rate 
depreciations on posi디ve monetary shocks increase With the degree 
of price stickiness. At the same 디me. the variabilities of real 
variables also increase because more and more firms adjust their 
prices through the rule of thumb instead of optimal pricing rules. 
Finally. the correlation between nominal and real exchange rate 
increases as the nominal rigidity increases and it nicely matches 
With the data. πle markup responds negatively to a positive 
monetary shock and posi디vely to a posi디ve real shock. This plays 
an important role in generating the persistent and volatile exchange 
rate effects of monetary shocks. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section II. the 
model is presented. In section 111. the equilibrium and the impulse 
response of some real variables to monetary shocks are 밍lalyzed. 
Various second moments of the model are compared With those of 
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the data in section IV. Section V concludes the paper. 
11. Model 
A. Monopolistic Competition Model ωith a Cash-in-Advance 
Constraint 
Consider a world economy with two-countries. two goods. and a 
flexible exchange rate between the two moneys. πle home (foreign) 
country is completely specialized in the production of its own 
goods. Y,,(Yr). Here h denotes the home country. 밍ld J denotes the 
foreign country. The goods production is subject to the production 
shocks. Ah and AJ respectively. The ~νo currencies. home and 
foreign ‘ Mh and Mj are also subject to monetary shocks ‘ ωh and 띠 
1n this section. 1 present a iwo country model based on a dynamic 
extension of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1 987) and Stockman and 
Ohanian 11 993). and Svensson 밍H:l van W덴nbergen (1989). 1 extend 
their models by explicitly incorporating the monopolistic competition 
and staggered price set디ng rule as in Yun (1 994). 
The model in this paper is based on monopolis디cally competitive 
markets in which there exist a continuum of differentiated goods 
indexed by [O.IJ. Assume that utilities of consumers and additions 
to the aggregate capital stock depend only on the amount of a 
single composite good. This is associated with introducing a 마 
aggregator of the differentiated goods. Consider the aggregator2 
suggested by Dixit and Stiglitz (1 977) such that 
Jt 二 [J: dtU)l쟁펴 。 < ø < 1. ) l ( 
where J t denotes the number of units of the composite good at 
time t , and d페 is the measure of the purchases of the Jth good at 
time t. 3 Then the purchases of differentiated goods over [O , IJ are 
the solutions to minimize the total cost of obtaining J t such that 
mln 감PtU)dtU)여i S.t ι I 지 dtU)l 혜l암 (2:) 
2See Rotemberg and Woodford (1 992) for a detailed discussion of the 
spec퍼cation of the aggregator in monopolistically competitive goods market 
3I suppress a countη subscript. i. e. h and J in the explanation of an 
aggregator 
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where Pt{j) is the price of the jth good at time t. The cost 
minimizing demand for each differentiated good and the minimized 
cost are 
ι r PtV) 1-τ 
d;{j) = I 퍼:_ j J t. Pt=U; Pt{j)펀페l담「 
J;ptv때j)여j=PtJt 
The demand for each differentiated goods is determined by the 
above cost minimization when the demand for the composite good 
is given. This allows 야le f，이lowing op디mization problem of the 
household to be described in terms of the composite good only. 
a) Households 
Representative households in each countrγ choose consumptions 
and portfolio allocation to maximize 
Eo! ε βtU(C~(Clhht ， C2hhtl ，C웬C 1 hjl ， C2써 ，LhI))， 0< β < 1, (3) 
where Eo denotes the conditional expectations operator on the 
information available in period O. and Clh i1 and C 2hi1 (í 二 hJ) denotes 
cash good and credit good consump디on of the home resident at 
period t , respec디vely. as in Lucas and Stokey (1 987). L ht represents 
the leisure of the home resident at time t. Cdhh(Clhht ,C2hhtl and 
C제C1ψ ，C떼) is homogenous of degree one in both arguments 
respec디vely.4 The agent also faces the time constraint such that 
Lth + H ht 드 Hh, (4) 
where H ht , Hh denote the hours worked and time endowment of the 
home resident. Since the timing of markets and the transactions 
facing the household need to be specified , 1 explain it in some 
detail for the case of the home household. The household starts 
with nominal wealth θht. carried over from period t • 1 and receives 
the lump-sum transfers of home and foreign currencies , T，나1t. Thjt 
4Cdhh(C 1hh1, C2hhl) is C 2. concave and homogenous of degree one in both 
arguments with limc…r→oC안 hh(C 1 hh1 .C2h띠)= ∞‘ limCll.1 →OCd2싸C 1 hht. C2hh1) = ∞‘ C안hh 
(C 1hh1, C2hh')>O , C및hh(C 1 hhl ， C2 hh1)>O for C1hh.C2hh>O. The s없ne also holds for C
Q
hl 
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before the asset market opens. Though it is not at all difficult to 
incorporate greater asset diversity 밍ld reformulate the model. 1 、.\'ill
assume that the representative household chooses four assets as in 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1 995. 1996). that is. home and foreign 
currencies. M hh1 • MhJl as well as one period nominal con디gent horne 
currency bonds. Bhhl. BhJl at the asset markets. 5 
M hh1 + e1Mhjl + 13hh1 + Bhjt 드 θhl+Th1 • (5) 
where T h1 = 1ì에11 + e1Thjt and el is the nominal exchange rate at time t. 
Here Xl clenotes the state of the economy at time t. 
After the household’s transactions on asset markets. that market 
closes. εmd the goods market opens. At the goods market. the 
household c밍1 buy home 없ld foreign consump디on goods with 
home currency and foreign currency as well as with credit. It must 
pay for home goods with home currency 밍ld for foreign goods with 
foreign currency. Thus it faces the following cash-in-advance 
constraints. 
Ph1C 1 httl 드Mhh1 • 
16) 
PjlC 1 띠i 으M엔1. 
where P/'l 밍ld 암 is the home currency price of home goods and 
the forei당n currency price of foreign goods respectively. 
Moreover. each country’s household owns only its own country’S 
capital stock to rent to its countrγs firm and there is no firm 
specific capital stock. Since we do not empiric외ly observe large 
discrete capital stock adjustrnents. it is reasonable to introduce an 
adjustrnent cost in capital stock installments. If there are costs of 
installing: capital. the capital stock will move more sluggishly. 1 
assume that there are deadweight costs of installing capital stock. 
~e outstanding assets are money. one period bond. 없ld capital in each 
country. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1 995. 1996) introduce only one period risk 
free bond in their stic쩌， price modeI. saying that the assumption of 
complete asset markets would seem incongruous 외ongside the nominal 
rigidites. Chari. Kehoe. 없ld McHrattan (1996) consider a complete asset 
market ‘ Baxter and Crucini (1993) discuss the implications of complete a::1d 
incomplete asset market structure in a intemational real business cycle 
model. 
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To preserve 삼le simple model structure as far as possible. 1 will 
adopt the Uzawa-Lucas-Prescott form of investment adjustment 
costs. 
Kht+l = Ø(Iht/ Kht) + (l δhkt)Kht • (7) 
where Ø(Iht! K ht) is a posi디ve. concave function. and lht is the 
composite investment of the home resident at period t. and Kht is 
the composite capital stock of the home resident at period t. At the 
end of each period. the household receives wages. rents for capital. 
and dividends from each firm. Thus her wealth at the beg1nning of 
삼le period t 十 1 is given by. 
θht+l =Mhht +et+lMhjl + Bhht(l +iht) + Bhjl(l + ýJ 
(8) 
- Pht(Chht + lht) - et+lPjlChjl + W ht + RhtKht. 
Here Íht. Íft denote 1 period gross nominal interest rate of the home 
and the foreign country at period t. 밍ld Ilht. Wht. Rht denote the 
home country firm ’s nominal profits. nominal wages and nominal 
rental rate for capit려 stock given to the home residents respectively 
and Chht=C 1빼+ CZhht. Clift = C 1밴 +C2hJt. Xht=lht/ K ht .6 
The rela디onship between cash and credit goods can be derived 
from the first order conditions. As C dhht is assumed to be 
homogenous of degree one in its arguments. the ratio of domestic 
consumer’s demand for cash goods to credit goods (Clhht!CZhht) c없1 
be expressed as a function of domestic nominal interest rate. The 
ratio of domestic consumer's demand for cash goods to total 
consumption goods is also a function of domestic nominal interest 
rate. i.e. (C1hht! Chht) = h(iht) and the function 엉ht can be decomposed 
into domestic consumer's demand for domestic consumption good. 
Chht and domestic nominal interest rate. That is. 션써C 1뼈.C2뼈) =Chht 
~(iht). With these relationship. 1 can simplifY the first order 
conditions for domestic consumer's demand for domestic cash 없ld 
credit goods as follows. 
6Every differentiated consumption goo,d can be purchased as ‘ a ca욕h good 
and credit good. C뼈=( Jo' C뼈lj)l 갱)뉴 and C2뼈=대 C2뼈lj)' 예)". The 
S없ne holds for foreign consump디on goods. 
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Ul (C~lh(Clllht.C2빠.C업C 1댄.C21ψ Il‘ Lht)C잉hl(Clhht.C2hht) 二 !lh빠 
c~lhl(C'hht ‘ C2에lt) 
(1 0) 
C~h2 (C'hht ， C2hhtl 
where ~ (iht) = (ÍJ,t! C~씨 (C'ht~.C2hhtl). Flere !l 'lt is defined as βEt !l 'll ’ 1. 
where !l ht is a Lagrange rnultiplier of the dornestic household’s 
budget constraint (5) and Ui(') is a partial derivative of U with 
respect to a variable i. C잉lli is a partial derivative of C밍h(C1IlI 1l .C2hl ，，) 
with respect to a variable i. 
Sirnilarly. the relation between foreign cash and credit goods of 
the horne resident is given by 
U2(C~，h(C lI111t.C2hhtl.C밍끼C ，ψ .C2ψ)) .LhtlC~'hl(Clhht.C2hht) = !l ~irt ct. (11) 
cdhI1 (C lI1fl .C2hρ) 
~ ,= Í[l. (1딩) 
C퍼2(Clhht ， C2매 1) 
where (C'hfi/ Cliftl = h(떠 . (C~I/C낀/1) = ~(ψ). Et = (etPIt! Pht). ~ (irtl 
(μ/C~'fl(Clψ. C2Iift) ).7 
Without any artificial restriction on the asset transactions. 1 get 
the real exchange rate frorn (1 1) and (1 2). It is a function of the 
ratio of marginal utility of each country’ s consurnption good. and 





The real exchange rate that is derived frorn the assurnp디on that 
each household consurnes cash and credit goods is very sirnilar to 
the real εxchange rate.8 Et = (U2(떠/U ， (iht)) that is derived under the 
7From the assumption that C짜.j=h.꺼 is homogeneous of degree one in 
its arguments. 1 can derive the elasticity of substitution between cash goods 
and credit goods as ξ(띠 = (h'(itl /l + h띠). where h ’ = - (dlnh(iJ/ dlniJ. 
8Grilli and Roubini (1992). Schlagenhauf and Wrase (1993) have extended 
the idea of liquidity effect that is emphasized as an additional source of 
interest rate movement to the monetary shock (Lucas 1990; Furest 1992‘ 
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assurnption that individuals need cash to transact in asset rnarkets 
as in Grilli and Roubini (1 992). Next consider the first order 
conditions about dornestic and foreign one-period norninal bonds 
that pay one certain unit of horne and foreign currency at the 
beginning of period t十 1. 
Aht = ßEtl Aht+líhtl (1 4) 
Ahtet = ßEtl !lht + 1 et + 1 íft) (1 5) 
As the rnargin외 utility of wealth is given by the Lagrange rnultiplier 
of the budget constraint. the expected u디lity in period t of the 
horne currency bond is βEtlAht+d whose present value is ßEtlAht+dl 
Aht. Therefore the price of horne currency one period norninal 
interest rate equ외s ßEtL1ht+dl Aht. Sirnilarly. the price of foreign 
currency one period norninal bond is 핑ven by (ßEtIAht+l/et+llll 
(Aht! etl because the expected utility in period t of foreign currency 
one period bond is βEtI Aht+d et+d.9 
With these and the first order condition of investrnent. the first 
order conditions for the household can be surnrnarized as follows. 
Ul (Cdhh(C ， hhl.C2hht).C원C lhjl.C2hJt)) .Lht)Cdhhl (C lhh lo C2hht) = Jlhtíht. (16) 
U2(C연1h(C 1빼‘C2바t).C입C，벤.C2ψ)) ，Lm)C$111(Cl빠C211ht) 
= Aht $(Íht!(Íh! lí{t) él. 
d ",d 
U3(CUhh.Cïlf.Lht! = AhtWht. 
Aht 二
βEt[ Aht+1Pht • 1 Í},t• d 
P'll 
f ét 커 1 Alll+,Pjlíht+1 Íft 1 
Aht 二 더Etl I 
L étPhtíht ~ 





~hese two equa디ons imply the uncovered interest parity. Et[ 기hI I i씨 =E, 
[J1 h' ,e, tihll/e,. 
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where X(Xhl +1) = tþ(Xhl+ !l ψ(Xhl+ !lX'tI+1 + 1 δ ， tþ ’ I equals Tobin's q 
which is the ratio of the price of installed capital to 야le price of 
replacement capital , and nll 二 (RhdPht) ， u싸二 (W，tl / P h1). Equation (2: 1) 
which is the first order condition with respect to the horne 
representative household’s investment represents the evolution of 
Tobin ’s q over time πlough 1 need not specify the functional form 
for adjustment cost function , tþ , 1 should specify three parametus 
which describe the behavior around the steady state. Fïrst, 1 m 1.:.st 
specify the steady state value of Tobin’s q and the share of 
investment in national product. Since the steady state value of 
Tobin's q is 1 , 1 also set the value of this variable to 1.0 in steady 
state. And 1 will take the same investment share in steady state as 
in a model without adjustment cost. Next, 1 have to specify Üle 
parameter which determines the elas디city of marginal adjustment 
cost function. AB there has been no study about this adjustment 
cost paJrameter v떠ue ， 1 will present several results through 
sensitivity analysis in next section. Equation (23) says that the jth 
consump디on goods and investment goods are determined by the 
cost minimization demands when the composite demands are given. 
Next , 1 follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1 993) in deriving the 
Frisch demand functions for consumption and leisure. This meth.::>d 
allows one the convenience of making assumptions about these 
function딩 rather than about the parameters of preferences directly. 
From the above equa디ons ， 1 can derive the Frisch consumption 
demand 밍ld labor supply functions as 
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Chlll =C연，h( Ahl ,Wh[ ,ih[ ,ýt. cd (24) 
ChJt=C원 Aht ， Wht ， iht ， ýt. cd (25) 
Htu =Hsh(Aht.Wht.Îht ,ýt.ét! (26) 
In the above equation the effects of all future variables. i.e. their 
expecta디ons are reflected in the margin려 utility of we외삼1. Aht. 
That is. the home household's demand for home and foreign 
consump디on goods and labor supply depend on her own wea1th. 
current wage rate , interest rate (home and foreign) as well as the 
spot rea1 exchange rate. This is comparable to that of the 
traditiona1 international IS-LM model. 
Moreover. if 1 assume that the nominal interest rate is posi디ve. 
then the cash-in-advance constraint is a1ways binding, and thìs 
leads to the relationship that the rea1 balance of each country is 
cointegrated with its own consump디on. 
M ht 
τ-= h(iht)Ch( Ahb Aρ，ωht.ψJl.lht ， ψ. ct). 
rht 
(27) 
where Ch is the tota1 consump디on demand for home goods. Here 1 
used the domestic money market equilibrium condition. 
~ht =~tu =Mhtu + MJht, (28) 
where Mht denotes foreign representa디ve household’s demand for 
foreign currency. 
b) Firms 
In my model differentiated goods and monopolistic compe디디on 
are introduced a10ng the lines of Dixit and S디glitz (1977). Suppose 
that there are a continuum of firms producing differentiated goods. 
and each firm indexed by 0 드j 드 1, produces its product with a 
constant returns to sca1e. concave production technology. Each firm 
j takes P"t and the aggregate demand as given. and chooses its own 
product price PhtU). Since the input markets are perfectly 
competi디ve. the demands for labor and capital are determined by 
its cost minimization as follows. 
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C(WhloRhlo Yh1.HhO.Zhl) == mínH서jl.K"udRh1KhlU) + WhHhlU)} (29) 
subject to 
Yh1U) 르AhlF(KhlU)，Zhl(HhtU) - H hO)) 
Here H hO , Zht. and A'll are the home country resident’s fixed 
overhead cost in units of labor hours. labor augmenting permanent 
technology progress. and transitory technology process at period t. 
YhtU) 10 and HhtU) are the output and total labor input of the Jth 
firm in the home country respectively. 1 assume that the technology 
shock follows an AR(1) process. Tbe permanent changes in the total 
factor productivity. Zht are taken as gro삐ng deterministically. i. e. )' h 
= (Z" rI Zht-l) for all t as in King. Plosser 없ld Rebelo (1 988a. hereaftu 
KPR (1 988a)). 
lnAhl = PhlnAhl-l + ~ Aht. -1 < Ph< 1. (30) 
where E( ~'Ahl) = 0 없ld ~Ahl is í.í.d. over time. 
As the production function is CRS. marginal cost is independent of 
the level of output. Thus the finn ’s cost minimization conditions 
can be written as 
R ht = MClùAh1F1 (Klùlil.Zlll(HhtU) - HhO)) (31 ) 
W ht = MClùAhtFz(Kh1(j).Zhl(HhlU) - H hO)). (32) 
where MCh1 is the mar탱n외 cost of the firm at time t. Moreover. 
CRS of the production function implies that ((HhlUl- H hO) / KhlUl) ,= 
((Hhl • HhO)/KIù) for 외1J 와ld thus the cost minimization conditions 
specified in the above equations hold for aggregate quantities. 11 
c) Staggered Price Set디ng 
In this subsection. 1 use a discrete time version of Calvo (1 983)-
style staggering price set디ng rule. 1 follow Yun (1 994) ’s strategy to 
lOyh•U) = A.hlF(KhL{j).Zhl(HhlU)- HhO)) is strictly concave. twice continuously 
differentiable. and CRS in K싸) and HhLU)- HoUI but it is IRS in Kh.U) and 
HhlUI 
" Here Khl = fo' KhlU)ψ. HhlU) = fo'HhlU)대 
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model a monopolistically competi디ve finn’s p디ce setting rule. 
focusing on the monopolistic compe디디ve finn in the home country. 
1 will suppress the country subscript for simplicity. The monop-
olistic compe디tion finns in the product markets set their own 
prices in advance by maximizing the present discounted value of 
profits. Suppose that only the fraction (1 - a) of the finns sets 야le 
new price. Pu and the other fraction of finns. a sets its price by 
mul디plying the average inflation rate or average monetary growth 
rate ω by their previous price level. That is. suppose 삼lat 
individual firms have a constant probabili양 (a) of adjus디ng their 
prices 야lrough 야le rule of thumb. 야lOU방1 non-constant hazard rate 
is probably more plausible. Let Dt.t+k denote the demands at period 
t + k facing finns that set their prices at 디me t. and Pt .t+k 삼le prices 
at period at t+k that are predetennined at time t. Sínce the 
probability that the finn sets its new price optimally is (1- a) in 
discrete time version of Calvo (1 983) model, 12 밍ld it is assumed 
that this probability of set디ng new price level for each finn is 
independent of the time elapsed since the last price change. the 
finn ’s maximization problem can be written as follows. 
∞ ν 끼‘ kPt 
ax.EtI 2:( aß )k:[~수..:_ (Pu+kDt.t+k- MCt + kDu+닝 11. t:1J' -,- " !l tPt+k 
(33) 
where PU+k= ψkpU. w=(ω/'r). and !l t 밍ld !lt+k are the margin려 
utility of wealth at time t and t+ k and k= 0. 1.2 ..... 
The first order condition of this newly determined price at time 
is given by 
11'here is both microeconomic and macroeconomic evidence against the 
constant hazard (probability) model. This evidence favors models where the 
probability that a firm will change its pIice is increasing in the extent to 
which its pIice departs from its from desired p디ce. Unfortunately. only 
restIictive models of this t)φe have been solved to date. The most 
thoroughly studied case is by Caplin and Leathy (1 992) who analyze a 
model of fixed cost of chan밍ng pIices where money follows a random walk. 
But this study is unsatisfactory for my purpose. because it neglects a seIial 
correlation in money growth rate. which from an empiIical point of 이ew. 
appears important. 
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E t[ 승 (aβ)k과투 Du+kMCt+kl 
Pt.t=~ ∞ - , 악 (34) 
(1-뼈t[잃 (aβ!ÌJ)k쉰ff Dt t+kl 
∞ 
Since P-~ = L Usp~-s.s and Pt - s
‘
s-- ψSPt ← s.t → s ， s=0，1，2，-"，∞， and us 二
αsuo- liO 二 1...:'뚱 the price level satisfies the recursive form such that 
Pl-' =(1- α)p{'.t+awP간 l (35) 
When a=O , the op디miza디on conditions are reduced to that of 





If the price level is f1exible , then the markup - the ratio of price 
to margin떠 cost - is constant at each period , while it responds to 
monetary’ and real shocks when prices are predetermined. 
d) Monetary Authori양 
Suppose that the central bank of each country p디nts its own 
currency and distributes it to the whole world residents in 
lump-sum transfer fashion. T/ú, 1ft, before the opening of the asset 
markets at every pe디od. That is. the home and foreign countries’ 
money stock at time is given by 
~'I=M자← 1 + Tht. Tht 드 Thhl + Thjl = (Wht - I)MhH. 
(3.7) 
Mjl 二M한l+T/ú. TJt 三 TJfl+ η11 = (ωρ - I)Mjt-J. 
Moreover , 1 assume that the monetary authority of each country 
sets its own money supply growth rate according to an AR(l) 
process. 
B. Equilibrium 
1 assume that the net supply of each bond is zero as in Obstfeld 
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and Rogoff (1 995). So that the home currency bond market clearing 
condition is given by 
Bhlll + Bjhl = O. (38) 
As the net foreign asset holding changes is equal to the interest 
payment minus net exports of goods. the current account surplus 
(deficit) equals 야le capital account deficit (surplus). 
PhlChI - el+1PjtChfl = Bjhl+l - el+1Bhfl+l + ihlBjhl - el+l센8hfl. (39) 
With the home currency bond market clea디ng condition B hIll = 一 Bjhlo
the domestic financial asset accumulation and the overall balance 
of payments13 imply that 
AhlF(Khl.ZhI(Hhl - HhO)) = ChI + lh1. (40) 
where C hI = C hh1 + Cjhl. Similarly. 야le foreign currency bond market 
clearing condition and the budget constraint imply that 
AjtF(Kjl.zjl(Hjt - HJO)) = Cjl + lfl. (41) 
where Cρ =Cffi+Cψ1. As 1 will focus on the symmeσic equilibrium in 
which all agents in the same country make the same decisions in 
what follows. 1 will define a symmetric equilibrium. The symmetric 
equilibrium conditions consist of the efficiency conditions of the 
home and foreign consumers and firms. and each goods market. 
capital rental market. labor market. money and bond market in 
each country clear. 14 
Specifically. a symmeσic equilibrium is an allocation of home 
agents IChhl.Chjl.Khl+l.Xhl.Hhlrl~O. a sequence of prices and costate 
variables for the home country IPht.t .PhI .Rhl. !lhl.Whl.MChl.ihd~I~O. 
satisfYing equilibrium conditions (1 9)-(21). (24)-(27). (31)-(32). 
13Here the overall balance of payments is zero. because the sum of the 
current account surplus and the net change in foreign debt which is 
defined as the overall balance of payments is always zero 
l~he aggreg따e output in each country. is given by y， =(J; F(κUI.z，(H，UI­
Holll .c낀11/ (l ψ1 But this is not a convenient form because it is desirable to 
express aggregate output as a function of aggregate factors _?띠y πlis can be 
done easily if we define an alterna디ve price index as P, =대PtUl 1 ’φ11/(1 '1 
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(34)-(35), 없ld (4이 as well as the corresponding foreign conditions 
given KhO ,Ph “ 1,Kh-1 ,PJ-l and IM51ú，M고Aht.AJtrt야. 
As 1 am interested in a stationary equilibrium. 1 make tbe 
economy stationary by deflating all nominal variables with the level 
of the relevant money supply. After that. 1 approximate a sta디onaly 
equilibrium involving small fluctuations around it by the solution of 
the 10g-linear approximation to the equilibrium condition as in KPR 
(1988a). 
111. Quantitative Evaluation of the Model 
A. Parameter Values 
To get the quantita디ve implications of the model. 1 will utilize tbe 
f이10뻐ng CES subu디lity function which satisfies the condition I)f 
balanced growth path 
U(C%，〔꺼l “ 
| ι ---v(L) ‘ 
UIC'hh.C믿{.L꾀 = 1 1 σm 
O'ch"'" 1. σch>O. 
(4:2) 
‘ lnU(Cdhh.C웬 +v(니 σch= 1. 
where 
서 서 ‘ ( [8((셔뼈)1-5h+ (1_ 8(C'제 l → 5h)] (I /11-5hJl. Sh>O. Sh"'" 1. 
U(Cahh.Cahrl 녁 • • ‘ ι (4:3) 
\ (C'hhl " (C'hfl ‘ " Sh= 1 
Here σ짜 없ld Sh1 is 야le intertempora1 and intratemporal elas디city of 
substitution in consumption between home and foreign goods of the 
home household respectively. As noted by Svensson and van 
Wijnbergen (1 989). the sign of a cross derivative U12 is determined 
by the re1ative size of the intertempora1 and inσatemporal 
elastici디es of substitution. i. e. sgn(u !2l = sgn( σ꾀-해. With th::s 
tempora1 u디lity function. 1 can determine the parameter valuεs 
which wiU be used in the simulation. Because 1 set up a two 
country world with the s없ne features. 1 will use the s없ne values 
for each par밍neter. 15 h(때 in equation (27) is determined by an 
average velocity of money in the home country. 
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dlnv dlnh 
v(i;) = h(iJ - ,• - • for i 二 h’-
dlni; dlni; -
Sínce money is defined as Ml. I have MjPC=0.34. From the fact 
that consumption is su피ect to cash-in-advance constraints. and Ch 
二 SchY바 at steady state, it follows that 
Mh í Mh\ 
h(iJ = _ __ • ln I ~I =lnsch+lnh(iJ+lnYh. 
SchPhYh ‘ Ph I 
Lucas (1987) found that the long-run income elas디city of money is 
1 and the long-run interest rate semi-elas디city is - 0.07 for 
1958-85 and -0.09 for 1900-85 for M1 • 1 ‘mll take Lucas (1 987) ’s 
estimate of the elasticity of money with respect to interest rate. In 
sensi디vity analysis. 1 will also use a much smaller value of interest 
elastìcity of money demand -0.01 because the degree of money 
demand over the business cycle is much smaller than in the long 
mn as in King and Watson (1 995). That is. h'(i,) = -7 and - 1. The 
monetary growth rate is estimated using US monetary base data for 
a domestic monetary policy. Assuming that a monetary base gro\\πh 
rate of US follows AR(l). its estimates over 1972: 1-1994: 1 is given 
by 
lnWhi = 0.00146(0.00646)+ 0.08674(0.60569)lnWIú -l + ÇMh!. 6MIú =0.00813. 
(44) 
where the numbers in the parenthesis represent the standard 
errors and δMIú is the standard deviation of home countIγ money 
gro\\πh rate. Though it is desirable to estimate the corresponding 
monetary base measure of foreign countries. some countries do not 
have the comparable measure for US monetary base. Moreover. 
since Schlagenhauf and Wrase’s (1993) resuIts. which were 
obtained from the estimation of a bivariate monetary base growth 
process by excluding those countries that do not have the 
corresponding monetary measure show that the estimates are 
lsrhe steady state relations also pro띠de the restrictions on the other 
par밍neter values used in the calibration. For the home country case. 
im= yr ”“ (ωh/β). Sch = 1 - y，，"이((1-σctJ( y,, -1 + δ)/ (rh - 8)). and β= yÎ,"d. (1 + rtJ 1 







































1HE CALIBRATED PARAMETERS 
Descrip디on of Parameters 
steady state quarterly growth rate of technology 
steady state labor share 
rate of depreciation of capital stock 
steady state rate of retum 
lntertempor떠 elasticity of consumption 
intratemporal elasticity of labor supply 
intratemporal elasticity of consumption 
semi-elasticity of demand for money(percent) 
inverse of steady state consumption velocity 
μ 1.1. 1.5 steady state markup 
TJq 1 elas디city of substitution between capit떠 an.d 
labor 
EHK 1. 5. 10. 100 elasticity of i/ k to Tobin’s q 
Notes: Country s ubscript8 (hJ) are suppressed. The same parameter values 
are used 1n the home country and the foreign country. 
Techmlogy . I p% 야ν 1 _ r 0.906 0.088 1 r r1꺼hh 꺼if 1 _ r 0 ,00852 0.258 1 
Shock* ' L 채1 P1r J L 0.088 0.906 J' L a~ 얘 J L 0.258 0.00852 J 
Monetary r 짜 꽤 1 r 0.600 0. (뻐 1 r 짜 σ'1.J 1 r 0.00813 0.000 1 
Shock . L 짜 돼 J L 0.000 0.600 J ’ L a^þ, a'1r J l 0.000 0.00813 J 
* (Jlj represents the covariance between variables i . j. 
simìlar to those of the US. it is not unreasonable to assume that 
the foreign country follows the s따ne mone않ry growth process. 깐lat 
is. 1 assume for simplification that each country’ s monetary policy 
is carried out independently.16 
As stated above. this paper assumes a two country world with 
iden디cal features as in Grilli and Roubini (1 992) and Schlagenhauf 
and Wrase (1993). For this reason. 1 will use the s와ne par없neter 
values of the US economy for the home country as well as for the 
foreign country. A1l parameter values used ìn this paper a r.e 
'6yhe estimated indirect spillover effects of monetary p이icy is so small as 
to be n썽igible as in Schlagenhauf and Wrase (1993). Chari. Kehoe. and 
McGrattan (1996) also assumed that the monetary policy 18 mutually 
independent between countries. 
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repoπed in Table 1. Most of them are taken from KPR (1988a). 
Lucas (1988). and Rotemberg 없ld Woodford (1 992). ln particular. 
one needs to note the intertempor외 elasticities of consumption and 
labor supply because these par없neter values are important in the 
quan디tative implications of the model. 1 ‘m11 suppress a countrγ 
subscript (hJ) from now on. Even though many RBC models 
assume that unit elas디City of inteπempor머 substitution (EC= 15.돼 
= 1) which is taken from Hansen 밍ld Singleton (1982). many 
empirical studies on consump디on te11 us to be more cautious and 
conservative in choosing the value. Thus the baseline model of this 
paper takes lower values of intertempor려 elas디city of consumption , 
σ'ch = 2 , i. e. Ec 二 1/2 없ld the intratempor머 elasticity of consumption 
s닙= 1/2. 1 also choose a conservative int-ertemporal elastici양 of 
labor supply, Eω(Hω) equ머 to 1 which is much lower than those of 
KPR (1 988a) and Rotemberg 없ld Woodford (1 993) and Yun (1 994). 
Of course. 1 wi11 use altemative parameter values , σch= 1. Eω=2 to 
see how robust the implications of the model are in the sensitivity 
analysis. The value of elastici앙 of i/ k with respect to Tobin’s q. ηq 
is the adjustrnent cost elasticity which reflects the v이atility of 
investrnent. Thou함1 many studies have estimated this adjustrnent 
cost parameter. there is s디11 a lot of unceπ.ainty on the size about 
the adjustrnents cost. 1 will choose 5 as the benchmark parameter 
value. 17 This parameter value has important implica디ons of the 
various second moments. When a very high value of elasticity is 
taken with a high degree of nominal rigidi양， then the output as 
we11 as employment become volatile as the ínvestrnents respond 
more to shocks. 18 
To discuss the implications of the adjustrnent cost elasticity, 1 
will report results for a wide r없1ge of the elastici양. i. e. when ηq 
1. 10 , 100 in Table 4. The nominal rigidity parameter value is also 
uncertain because the empirical value of this parameter changes 
depen며ng on the period of an interest and the estimation method. 
1 will report results for a wide r밍1ge of the nominal rigidity. while 1 
17Baxter 밍ld Crucini (1 993) used the elasticity of 15 as a benchmark 
parameter va1ue. But most empirica1 studies suggest a lower va1ue than this 
one. See Chirinko (1993) for detail 
18In Chari. Kehoe. 떠ld McGrattan (1 996). the standard deviation of 
output is 13 when firms preset prices for 6 quarters and the capi띠l 
adjustment cost is low in a Taylor-type s디cky price model. 
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will set α 二 1/2 in the sensitivity 없1alysis. 19 Fin떠ly. 1 will choo딩e 
1.1 as the benchmark average size of markup. μ. Though thls 
value is much lower than the value that m밍1y sources of evidence 
suggest. 20 it is consistent with the average markup estimates in 
Basu and Femald (1993). As this average markup value is ah"o 
conservative. 1 will use a higher markup value μ of 1.5 in tbe 
sensi디띠ty analysis to check whether there are any substantial 
difference in the implications of monopolis디c compe디tion model 
with sticky prices. 
B. Implications oJ the Model 
In this subsection 1 review the main goal of this paper and see 
whether the nominal price rigidity model with monopolis디c competi-
tion can explain the persistence 컨ffect of monetary shocks on tlle 
exchange rate as well as the sharp responses of the exchange rate 
In particular. 1 compare the moments of the model with properties 
of data drawn from major industrial economies. 
a) Some Intuition 
As the cash in advance constraint is bin이ng in equilibrium. tlle 
money market equilibrium conditions imply equation (2끼 and tlle 
corresponding one of the foreign country. The difference of these 
log-lineariized equa디ons and the uncovered interest parity condition 
lead to 
M"h1 -1떠1-(Ph(-PJ()=h’ (Ütt)(E(낭(+1 • 낱) + (Ch{-CJll , (45) 
where x( is the percentage of deviation of X{ from its stationaly 
value X. 깐1e response of nominal exchange rate to a positive horne 
monetary shock depends on the response of price level as well as 
that of consump디on in each country to the shock. When prices are 
flexible and some consump디on goods are subject to inflation tax 
via cash in advance constraints , the consump디on for home goods 
l~here is a lot of unceπainty in tlle degree of price 디giditles. The range 
of empirical values for fue degree of price rigidi디es (a) are estlmated 
around 0. '75 or 0.85. Yun (1994) set a=O.82. for his endogenous money 
supply model in his paper. King lmd Watson (1 995) used 0.9 as a 
benchmark par없neter value in a C떠vo-style stic애 price model. 
20See Rotemberg and Woodford (1 992) for more detailed discussion and 
references about markup. 
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will decrease to a posi디ve home monetary shock. The above 
equa디on implies that the nominal exchange rate will depreciate 
엄{>E{ê{+d because the semi-interest elas디city of money demand is 
negative 없ld the real balance in each country responds little to the 
shock. When prices are sticky. the posi디ve effect of real balance 
dominates the negative effect of inflation 떠x on consump디on so 
that real balance and consump디on increase together. Moreover. the 
above equation says that the nominal exchange will overshoot to a 
posì디ve home monetary shock and its response will increase as the 
price stickiness increases. 
Next. the let’s consider the response of real exchange rate to a 
positive home monetary shock. Because the real exchange rate is 
defined as e{ = (e페/ Ph{). 야le response of r-eal exchange rate to a 
posì디ve home monetary shock can be read from 
Ê{=낱{+Pf{-Pfl. (46) 
The response of real exchange rate depends on not only the 
response of nominal exchange rate. but also the response of price 
level. The nominal exchange rate depreciates to a pos따ve home 
monetary shock whether prices are sticky or flexible. But as 
equation (46) shows. the response of the real exchange rate to a 
positive monetary shock is determìned by the relative response size 
of the nominal exchange rate and price IeveI to the shock. If prices 
are either fully flexible or just a little bit sticky. then the effect of 
price increase will dominate that of nomìnal exchange rate 
depreciation. As the nominal rigidity increases , however. the price 
effect decreases and the effect of the nominal exchange rate 
depreciation dominates the price effect, which leads to the real 
exchange rate depreciation. Moreover , as the real exchange is a 
ratio of a marginal utility of foreign consump디on goods to that of 
home consumption goods , the monetary shock can generate a 
hump-shaped real exch밍1ge effect ìn s디C석T prices model when 
consump디on responds slowly to the shock. As households cannot 
adjust their money demands to a positive monetary shock so 
flexibly in the short run , the interest elasticity of money demand 
can be lower than in the long run. In this case , a positive 
monetary shock leads to a hump-shaped consumption response and 
thus a hump-shaped real exchange rate response. In next 
subsection , the real exchange shows a hump-shaped response to a 
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positive home monetary shock when the interest rate elasticity of 
money demand takes a lower value than the long run value as in 
King and Watson (1 995). 
b) Persistent Effects of Home Monetary Shock 
The flrst issue that 1 address is if actual data impubes 
correspond to the dynamic responses of exchange rates and real 
activities to monetary shocks implied by this “ sticky-price" model. 
The main results of Clarida and Gali (1993) ’s SVAR and 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1 993) ’s V AR21 can be summarized as 
follows. A positive shock to the US monetary policy is associated 
with persistent nominal and real depreciations of the US dollar ηs 
a vis each foreign currency considered ‘ and increased US output 
The mmömum depreciation of exchange rates occur at two to four 
quarters fi이lowing a monetary shock. Here 1 discuss the model ’s 
implications. 
First. let’s consider the response of the real exchange rate to 
monetary shocks. In the fIexible price international monetary model 
with no slu땅sh adjustment in portfolio , when there is a positive 
monetary shock in the home countπ， consumption falls , while 
investment increases. This is easily explained. An increase in the 
infIation rate acts like tax on cash good consump디on and like a 
subsidy on credit good (credit good consumption and investment). 
Thus the real exchange rate which is a ratio of a margin떠 utility 
of foreign consump디on goods to that of home consumption goods 
appreciates as home goods consumption decreases to a positive 
monetary shock in the home country as Figure 1 shows. The 
inflation rate goes up more than the increase in the money growth 
rate at the moment of a monetary shock in the fIexible price 
model. The impulse responses of the endogenous variables to 
monetary shocks change little even when 1 use different values of 
elasticity of i/ k with respect to Tobin’s q in the fIexible price ca든.e. 
This relationship reverses , however , and the response of infIation 
rate to a monetary shock weakens as prices become sticky. 
21 Eichenbaum and Evans (1993) use NBR (Non Borrowed ReservesJ, 
NBRX (ratio of NBR to Tota! Reserves). and Romer and Romer index to 
measure monetary shocks. Their empirical results are robust to the 
measure (If a monetary p이icy shock. 
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FIGURE 1 
The impulse response of the endogenous variables to exogenous 
shocks va디es depending on the degree of nornfnal 디gtdity in the 
model as well as some deep par와neter values such as 
inteπempor려 elasticities of labor supply 없ld consump디on ， As 삼le 
degree of nornfnal 디gidity increases. the endogenous variables 
which are the household’s decision rules respond more to a 
monetary shock. This result is due to the fact that 야le slug핑sh 
p디ce adjustment to a posi디ve monetruy shock causes 삼le markup 
to move much more nega디vely as the degree of price rigidity 
increases. and this leads the demand for labor to move upward 
more as the markup adjusts more nega디vely， Thus both investment 
and output increase as mar맹1외 product of capital: goes up with 
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the increase in labor demand. Since the home country firms are 
more directly affected by the home monetary shock than the forei동;n 
country fìrms. they respond more ac디vely to the shock by adjusting 
their markup more aggressively. So the responses of investment 
and output in the home country to a posi디ve monetary shock of 
the home country are greater than those of the foreign country. 
Similarly. as consump디on for home goods is directly affected by 
home monetary shock and the price adjusts slowly to this shock. 
consump 디on of home goods increases more than that of foreign 
goods. and so the real exchange rate depreciates. This response of 
real variables to a posi디ve home monetary shock becomes sπong녕r 
as more and more firms depend on rule of thumb markup 
adjustments rather than op디mal price set디ng rules as shown m 
Figure 1 뼈th σc二 2 and ηq=5. With these responses of markup 
and labo:r to a monetary shock. the reactions of capital stock and 
output also become much more volatile as the degree of price 
rigidity increases. Thus as the real qu밍1디디es respond more ':0 
monetary shocks. price responds less to monetary shocks with the 
increase of price 디gidity a. 
Though there is only a ne멍igible difference in the degree of 
nominal exchange rate depreciation whether one assumes a flexible 
price model or a s디cky price model as Schlagenhauf and Wrase 
(1 993) note. the response of nominal exchange to a monetary shock 
increases as the nominal rigidity i.ncreases. As shown. the degree of 
real exch밍1ge rate depreciation becomes higher and hi방ler as the 
degree of nominal ri탱dity a increases. These properties ch밍1ge little 
even when some sensiti띠ty 밍lalysis is performed by changing the 
inteπemporal elasticities of consump디on and labor supply. and the 
average markup values. Overall. the sticky price models wi1h 
monopolis디c competi디on seem to perform better than flexible price 
models with compe디디on in that the former implies that real 
exch없1ge rate depreciates to a posi디ve home monetary shock for 
longer periods than the expected price preset디ng periods. By 
contrast. a flexible p디ce model. whether it is a full information 
model or some slug핑sh model. irnplies a distorting apprecia디on or 
depreciaÜlon of real exchange rate only 1 quaπer. at most. These 
fin며ngs of s디cky price model match well with both Clarida and 
Gali (1993)’s SV AR result and Eichenbaum and Evans (1 993)’s VAR 
result. However. it is stiU unsatisfactory that the time at which the 
maximum depreciation rate to posi디ve monetary shocks occurs is 
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not 2 or 3 quaπers after shocks. but only at the moment of 
shocks. The impulse responses of nominal exchange rates are not 
satisfactory in that the maximum depreciation to a posi디ve 
monetary shock occurs in the period of the monetary shock 
irrespective of the par밍neter values. Overall. the stic함 price model 
with monopolistic compe디tion performs better than the flexible price 
model. 
c) Variabilities and Serial Correlations 
In this subsection. 1 compare volatilities and serial correlations of 
the real variables of baseline model with those of data to see the 
over외1 perform없lce of the model. The column labelled ‘Data’ in 
Table 2 is reproduced from Baxter 없ld Crucini (1993) and 
Schlagenhauf 밍ld Wrase (1993) where moments are calculated for 
actual time series that have been Hodrick-Prescott filtered. This 
column reports composite data moments of six counσies (Canada. 
France. Germany. Japan. United Kingdom. and United States). 
First. consider the standard deviation of the variables in model 
and data. A prominent feature about the exchange rate movement 
is its (excessive) v이a비i양 relative to other real variables as can be 
seen in Table 2 where some selected moments of data are 
presented. While the standard deviation of nominal and real 
exchange rates in data is 7.32 and 6.95. respec디vely. the ma찌mal 
standard deviations of each variable in the baseline model is 2.56 
and 4.13. respectively. However. when firms c밍1 fully adjust their 
prices every period and there is no capital adjustment cost. the 
standard deviation of real and nominal exchange rate is 0.82 and 
1.59 respectively. Their relative volatilities to output are 0.45 and 
0.84 whose values are very low compared to those of data. The 
volatilities of the other variables are comparable to those of the 
flexible price model of Schlagenhauf and Wrase (1993). When h외f 
of firms in the economy adjust their prices optim려ly. and the other 
h려f adjusts their prices by a simple markup with pre찌ous prices. 
i. e. when a=0.5. the standard deviation of real and nominal 
exch밍1ge rates increases to 1.87 and 1.69 respectively. This is 
because firms cannot adjust price as well as capital optimally when 
there are substantial adjustment costs of capital ( ηq=5) and price. 
It is noteworthy 야lat the volatilities of real and nominal exchange 
rates increase as the degree of price stickiness increases. This is 
due to the fact that markups respond more to monetary shocks 





Rea1 Exchange Ra te (E) 
Nomina1 Exch없1ge Rate (e ) 
Cross Corr. (e. E) 
TABLE2 
MOMENTS OF DATA 
Std. Dev. AutOCOIT. Cross coπ. with GDP 
(Relative) t-l t - 2 X( 4 Xt 1 X( X( . I X ,( 4 
1.88(1.00) 0.870.67 0.26 0.87 1.00 0.87 0.26 
1.43(0.76) 0.86 0.71 0.50 0.89 0.88 0.71 0.12 
6.32(3.37) 0.91 0.730.24 0.830.950.880.33 
6.95(3.70) 0.81 0.600.070.260.260.300.38 
7.32(3.90) 0.83 0.63 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.32 0 .4 2 
0.99 
and to rea1 shocks as 삼le degree of nomina1 디gidity increases. The 
relative volatilities of rea1 and nomina1 exchange rates decrease if 1 
use hi방ler va1ues of the elasticity in the sensitiv1ty an려ysis. í. e . if 
there is little adjustrnent cost 1n cap1 ta1 installment. This is 
because the lnvestrnent responds more to a pos띠ve monetary 
shock and thus labor employment and output respond very 
excess1vely to the shock. 
Next. note that the autocorrelations of the model have the sarne 
sign as those of data. 허though the va1ues are a little bit lower 
compared to data. One quan다tative issue that 1 address is whether 
exchange rates drawn from simulations of this model are as highly 
persistent as in the actual data. Actua1 exchange rate movements 
are highly persistent as indicated by first-order autocorrelation 
coefficients for nominal and rea1 exchange rates of 0 .8. (See Table 
2) . The first-order autocorrelation coefficients for exchange ra t.es 
drawn from the model are in the range of 0.7 and 0 .6 whose 
values are comparable to those of data. These values do not change 
in the sensiti띠양 analysis. In the contempor킹leous correlation with 
output. consumption and investrnent comove similarly with output 
as data. 
Fin려ly. 1 wil1 go over the contemporaneous correlation between 
real and nomina1 exchange rates. ln the data. nominal and rea1 
exch하1ge rates are highly correlated (0.99). while in the flexible 
price model without adjustrnent cost the correlation is negligible 
( - 0.06) . ln the stic셰 pr1ce model. 야le correlation between nomina1 
없ld real exchange rate increases as the nominal rigidi양 increa:3e. 
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TABLE 3 
MOMENTS OF BENCHMARK MODEL 
V하iable 
ec= 1/2 μ = 1.1 




Real Exch밍1ge Rate (é) 
Std. Dev. AutoCOIT. Cross corr. with GDP 
(Rela디ve) t-l t-2 X, 4 X , I xt X ' . I X, 4 
Eω=4 ηq =∞ sh =2 
1.89(1.00) 0 .760.56 0.26 0.76 1.000.76 0 .26 
1.07(0.63) 0 .82 0 .66 0 .38 0.730.87 0.67 0.21 
4.36(2.31) 0.72 0 .50 0.15 0.690.960.73 0.25 
0 .82(0.43) 0 .870.71 0 .29 0 .380.380.19 -0.02 
Nominal Exchange Rate (e) 1.51(0.84) 0 .520.23 0.06 0.100.11 0 .07 -0.02 
Cross COIT. (e. é) 
Ec= I/2 μ = 1.1 
a = 0 .5 
Domestic Ouφut 
-0.06 
é w = 1 η。= 5 sh=2 
1.02(1.00) 0.55 0 .34 0 .11 0.55 1.00 0 .55 0.11 
Domestic Consumption 0.90(0.88) 0.770.57 0.12 0.540.830.67 0 .24 
Domestic Investment 2 .07(2.03) 0 .260.05 0.05 0.350.81 0 .22 -0 .07 
Real Exchange Rate (é) 1.87(1 .84) 0 .70 0 .46 0 .0 4 0 .38 0 .63 0 .49 0.13 
Nominal Exchange Rate (e) 1.69(1.65) 0.51 0.22 0 .00 0 .33 0 .59 0 .21 0.10 
Cross Corr. (e. é) 
Ec = 1/2 μ= 1. 1 
a = 0 .75 
Domestic Output 
Domestic Cons umption 
Domestic Investrnent 
Real Exch밍1ge Rate (é) 
0 .56 
Eω= 1 η。 = 5 sh=2 
1.58(1.00) 0 .55 0 .27 0 .00 0 .55 1.00 0.55 0 .00 
0 .99(0.63) 0.71 0 .49 0 .01 0 .470.820.56 0 .13 
3.66(2.33) 0.500.21 -0 .01 0 .500.93 0 .44 -0.09 
2 .38(1.51} 0 .630.36 -0 .04 0 .350.63 0.39 0.04 
Nominal Exch강1ge Rate (e) 1.92(1 .22) 0.52 0.22 -0 .05 0 .350.71 0 .38 -0.01 
Cross COIT. (e . é) 
Ec = 1/2 μ = 1. 1 




Real Exch없1ge Rate (é) 
0 .92 
Eω= 1 η0 = 5 sh=2 
2 .09(1.00) 0 .730.49 0 . 14 0 .73 1.000.73 0 . 14 
1.4 1(0 .67) 0 .740.51 0 . 10 0 .670.940.41 0 .05 
4 .10(1.97) 0 .72 0 .49 0 . 16 0.71 0 .960.68 0.09 
4 .13 (1 .98) 0.73 0.50 0 .08 0 .52 0 .73 0 .53 0.10 
Nomlnal Exchange Rate (e) 2 .56(1 .22) 0 .570.30 -0 .06 0 .370.71 0.54 0.14 
Cross COIT. (e . é) 0 .95 
Note: a denotes the probabUlty that a firm sets i않 price through rule of 
thumb. 
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As equat:ion (46) shows , when price stickiness increases the rea1 
and nominal exch밍1ge rates move very closely. Table 4 rep아ts that 
when 25% of price discrepancies are eliminated in each pe다od， the 
correlation between nominal and real exchange is 0.92. It increases 
to 0.95 when 10% of price discrepancies are eliminated in each 
period, which nicely matches with to data. 
이 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this subsection. some sensitivity analysis is performed by 
ch밍19ing some import밍1t parameter values. These are the 
intertemporal elasticities of consump디on and labor supply. and the 
elasticity of i/ k with respect to Tobin’s q and the average markups. 
Tables 4 and 5 report the results of sensitivity analysis conducted 
with respect to the supposedly critical parameter values when a 
equ외s 0 . .5. 
First. Table 4 reports the results when ηq takes a va디ety of 
values. both much smaller and much larger than benchmark value. 
i. e. when there are relatively much more adjust:ment cost and 
much less adjust:ment cost in capital stock installment. When the 
capital stock adjust:ment cost is much larger. for ex밍nple ηq= 1. 
capital stock responds very little to monetary shocks as it is costly 
to adjust capit외 stock. and thus the relative volatility of 
consump디on is much higher than that of data. while this relation 
iS reversed in invest:ment. These phenomena change when the 
adjust:ment cost becomes smalleL When there is less adjust:ment 
cost in capital stock installment. the firm can adjust its capital 
stock more flexibly to a monetary shock without much a이ust:ment 
of a markup. the vola디lity of invest:ment increases while that of 
consumpUon decreases. As a result, the ratio of a marginal u디lity 
of home consumption good to that of foreign consumption good 
moves less to a monetary shock. It is noteworthy that when the 
interest rate elasticity of money dem없ld is small 없ld 10 of price 
discrepancies are eliminated every period (a = 0.9) , the response of 
exchange rates to monetary shocks becomes volatile. Figure 2 
shows the impulse response function to a domestic monetaJl'y 
shock: Short dashed lines with a"=0.9 and TJq= 1. circled lines wi1h 
a=0.75 and ηq=5 ， and real lines with a=0.75 and ηq= 10. The 
size of an impulse response decreases when the capital adjust:ment 
cost increases. This result is due to the fact that firms cannot 
instant1y adjust their capital stocks. and thus their outputs to 
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TA파‘E4 
MOMENTS OF ALTERNATIVE PARAMETER V ALUES (II) 
Variable 
Std. Dev‘ Autocorr. Cross corr. with GDP 
(Relatlve) t-l t-2 X, 4 X, 1 xr X,‘ ’ 1 Xr ' 4 
εc= I/2 μ= 1.1 




R않1 Exchange Rate (ë) 
eω= 1 5h= 2 ηq= 1 
0.82(1.00} 0.68 0.47 0.18 0.68 1.00 0.68 0.18 
0 .95(1 .16) 0.780.570.170.660.930.75 0.26 
1.05(1.27} 0.34 0.08 0.10 0.38 0.63 0.19 -0 .10 
2.10(2.56) 0.71 0.460.050.450.690.53 0.13 
Nornina1 Exch원1ge Rate (e) 1.72(2.09) 0 .51 0 .22 0 .01 0.330.570.27 0.01 
Cross Corr. (e. ë) 





Re떠 Exchange Rate (é) 
0.63 
eω= 1 ηq = lO 5 ,,= 2 
1.24(1.00) 0.44 0.26 0.07 0 .44 1.00 0.44 0.07 
0 .84(0.60) 0.770.580.11 0 .460.750.59 0.21 
2.99(2.42) 0 .22 0.05 0.03 0.30 0.90 0.22 -0.04 
l.59(1.28) 0 .70 0 .45 0.04 0.34 0 .57 0.46 0 .11 










































Eω= 1 1}q= 100 5 ,, = 2 
1.73(1.00) 0 .31 0 .200.060.31 1.00 0 .31 0 .06 
Domestic Consumption 0.69(0.40} 0.770.590.160.400.650.43 0.13 
Domestic Investment 4 .97(2.86} 0.19 0.10 0.02 0.23 0.97 0 .22 0.03 
Rea1 Exch하1ge Rate (E) 1.23(0.73) 0 ‘ 790.61 0 .220.370.44 0 .33 -0.01 
Nomina1 Exch없1ge Rate (e) 1.63(0.94) 0 .51 0 .22 0 .03 0 .31 0.54 0.04 -0.04 
Cross Corr. (e, 다 
ec= 1/2 μ = 1.1 




0 . 18 
Eω= 1 ηq = 5 5 ,, = 2 
11,= -1 
2 .15(1.00) 0.80 0.58 0.18 0.80 1.00 0.80 0 .18 
1.41(0.66) 0 .800.580.11 0 .700.920.78 0.24 
4.36(2.03) 0 .790.560.220.790.950.73 0.11 
Rea1 Exchange Rate (ë ) 3.98(1 .86) 0 .820.600.090.680.600.49 0.13 
Nomina1 Exchange Rate (e) 2.27(1.06} 0 .74 0 .51 0 .03 0 .41 0.60 0.51 0 .15 
Cross Corr. (e. ë ) 0 .98 
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TABLE 5 
MOMENTS 0 1' ALTERNATlVE P뼈AMETER V.μUES (III) 
VaIiable 
Std. Dev. Autocorr. Cross corr. wi야1 GDP 
(Relative) t - 1 t - 2 X, 4 X t 1 Xt X t . 1 X t 4 





Rea1 Exch없1ge Rate (é) 
éw= 2 ηq = 5 sh= 2 
1.2 1(1.00) 0 .57 0 .35 0 . 14 0 .57 1.00 0 .57 0 .14 
l.15(0.95) 0 .790.59 0.14 0.550.840.69 0 .215 
2 .34(1 .93) 0 .28 0 .05 0.05 0.34 0.77 0 .19 -0 .13 
1.80(1.48} 0 .68 0.43 0.01 0.29 0 .53 0 .40 0 .11 
Nomina1 Exchange Rate (e) 1.69( l.4이 0 .500.21 -0 .01 0.29 0 .54 0 . 19 -0 .01 























































Eω=2 ’7q = 5 sh = 2 
1.3 1(1.00) 0.650.45 0 .18 0.65 1.000.65 0 .18 
l.46( 1. 11) 0 .790.59 0 .18 0.640.91 0.76 0 .28 
1.90(1 .45) 0 .22 0 .03 0 .10 0 .35 0.67 0.13 -0 .08 
Real Exchange Rate (é) 1.3 1(1.00) 0.70 0 .45 0.02 0.30 0.530.38 0 .07 
Nomina l Exch와1ge Rate (e) 1.59(1. 19) 0.50 0.20 -0.01 0 .19 0 .38 0.06 -0 .03 
Cross Corr. (e, E) 
Ec = 1/2 μ = 1. 1 
a = 0.9 
Domestic Output 
Domestic Consumption 
Domestic Investmen t 
Rea1 Exchange Rate (é) 
0.27 
Eω= 2 sh = 2 ηq= 5 
14= - 1 
2.10(1.00) 0 .81 0 .63 0 .240.81 1.000.81 0 .24 
l.7 1(0 .81) 0 .82 0 .61 0.150.74 0.95 0 .84 o.:n 
3.49(1 .66) 0 .82 0.61 0 .31 0.840.930.73 0.12 
4.07(1.94) 0.82 0 .61 0 .12 0 .55 0 .68 0 .57 0 . 17 


















































éw = 1 T}q= 5 sh= 2 
1.0 1(1.00) 0 .590.38 0.14 0.59 1.000.59 0 .14 
0 .96(0.95) 0 .780.58 0.15 0 .58 0.840.70 0 .25 
1.94(1 .93) 0 .26 0.06 0 .06 0 .35 0.77 0.21 -0 .06 
Real Exch없1ge Rate (é) 1.9 1(1.9이 0.71 0 .46 0.06 0 .42 0.660.53 0 .14 
Nominal Exch없1ge Rate (e) 1.7이1.69) 0.51 0 .22 0 .01 0.34 0.59 0.23 0.02 
Cross Corr. (e , é) 0.56 
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FIGURE 2 
mone따ry shocks. The response of exch밍1ge rates increases as 
degree of nomin외 디핑dities (a) 없ld the capital adjustment cost 
( ηq- l) increase. because price responds more slowly to the 
monet하y. while consumption 하ld ouφut adjust more volatile 
야le monetary shock to clear the money market. As a result, the 
real exch하1ge rate which is the ratio of a margin외 utility of home 




1 to 2. The standard 
when 
volatile. 
Second , Table 5 reports the result 
elasticity of labor supply ( éω) increases from 
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deviation of output and investment increase because the household 
can supply its labor more elastically to the wage rate change. whHe 
the standard deviation of consump디on. and therefore those of real 
and nominal exchange rates change little. 
Final1y. Table 5 also reports the results when the intertemporal 
elasticity of consump디on ( σcκ1) is larger than the inσatemporal 
elas디City of consump디on (Sh카). As one can see. there is little 
difference in the responses of the real variables. That is. the effect 
of price stickiness outweighs the effect of different intertemporal 
and intra.tempor떠 elas디city of consump디on. Thus. it seems that 
there is no much quan디ta디ve difference in the response of real 
variables when twO elasticities are not so different. In addition. 
Table 5 reports the results when a steady state markup value 
equals 1.5. The overal1 properties of tlle benchmark model are 
maintained 야1roughout in this case. 
IV. Conc:luding Remarks 
This paper inves디gates whether the monopolistic competition 
model with s디cky prices can generate persistent exchange rate 
effects from monetary shocks. and whether it can have volatile 
exchange rate movements. Consumption for domestic goods 
decreases and real exchange rates appreciate in response to a 
positive home monetary shock when there is little price stickiness 
in the economy. But when price becomes more s디cky. 야le demand 
for domestic consumption goods increases and its increase becomes 
larger th밍1 야lat of foreign consump디on goods. 80 the real 
exchange rate depreciates more persistently fo11o\\끼ng a positive 
home monetary shock since the markup responds more nega디vely 
Lo the shock. The vola디lity of exchange rates also 1ncreases as the 
degree of price stickiness increases. For example. the standard 
deviation of real exchange rate of the model becomes two thirds of 
that in data when the degree of price stickiness ( 이 is 0.9. This 
trend becomes distorted as markups respond more excessively to a 
monetaπ shock when the degree of capital stock rigidity becomes 
sma11er and sma11er and firms can adjust their capital more f1exibly 
to a shock. This is the shortcoming of the staggered price model 
without any other friction. 
Despite the model’s successes on exchange rate movements. the 
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maximum depreciation of the home real exchange rate in response 
to a posi디ve home monetary shock mostly occurs at the time of a 
monetary shock. This still leaves a room for other frictions to 
resolve the so-called fmward premium puzzle. The serial correlation 
of variables 없1d the correlation between real and nominal exch하1ge 
rates match well with data when the degree of price stickiness is 
hi방1. In the s디cky price model. the correlation between nominal 
and real exch없1ge rate increases as the nominal rigidity increase 
and it nicely matches to data. Overall. 1 find that the markup 
responds negatively to a posi디ve home monetary shock 와1d posi-
tively to a posi디ve home real shock. This plays a pivota1 role in 
generating a persistent exchange rate effects from monetary shocks 
as well as the volatile movements of the exchange rates. 
It is desirable to pay more aUention to heterogeneous consumers. 
in par디cular. the different liquidity levels of each consumer. As 
economic agents consider not only their past behavior. but also the 
average behavior of the economy. it is desirable to incorporate 
either extemal or intemal habit formation such as Abel (1 990) an 
Campbell 없1d Cochrane (1995) as an addi디on려 source of exchange 
rate volatility. To set up a dynamic general equilibrium model with 
this feature and analyze the effects of this liquidity constraint on 
the exch와1ge rate movements will be an interes디ng undeπaking for 
future research. 
(Received 30 september 2003: Revised 23 August 2004) 
References 
Abel. Andrew. B. “J녕set Prices under Habit Formation and Catching 
up With the Joneses." Ameπcan Economic Review Papers and 
Proceedings 80 (1990): 38-42. 
Basu. Susanto. 밍ld Femald. J. G. “ Constant Retums and Small 
Markups in US Manufacturing." Mimeograph. Universi앙 of 
Michigan. 1993. 
Baxter. M.. and Crucini. M. J. “ Explaining Saving-Investment 
Correlations." American Economic Review 83 (No. 2 1993): 
416-36. 
Blanchard‘ o. J.. and Kahn. C. M. ‘The Solution of Linear 
Difference Models under Rational Expecta디ons." Econometrica 
STAGGERED PRlCE, EXCHANGE' RATES AND MONETARY POLlCY 457 
4딩 (No. 5 1980): 1305-1 1. 
Blanchard. O. J .. and Kiyotaki. N. “ Monopolistic Competition a::1d 
the Effects of Aggregate Demand.'’ Amerícan Economíc Revíew 
7í’ (No. 4 1987): 647-66. 
Calvo. G. A. “ Staggered Prices in a U디lity-Maximizing Framework." 
Joumal oJ Monetarν Economics 12 (No. 3 1983): 383-98. 
Campbell. John. Y. ‘ and Cochrane. John H. “ By Force of Habit: A 
Consumption -Based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market 
Behavior." Joumal 0.[ Polítical Economy 107 (No. 2 1999): 
205-51. 
Caplin. A .. and Leathy. J. "Aggre당a디on and Optimization with State 
Dependent Pricing." Mimeograph. 1992. 
Chari, V. V .. Kehoe. P. J .. and McGrattan. E. R. “ Monetary Shocks 
and ReaI Exchange Rates in S디cky Price Models of 
International Business 다rcles." Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis Working Paper, 1996. 
Chirinko. R. S. “ Business Fixed Investment Spending: A Critical 
Survey of Modeling Strategies. Empirical Results and Policy 
Implications." Joumal 0.[ Economíc Líterature 31 (No. 4 1993): 
1875-911. 
Christiano. L.. and Eichenbaum. M. “Liquidity Effects. and the 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism." NBER Working Paper 
4129. 1992. 
Clarida. R.. and Gali. J. “ Sources of Real Exchange Rate 
Fluctuations: How Impoπant Are Nominal Shocks7" Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on pu blic Policy. 1993. 
Cooley. T. F .. and Hansen. G. D. ‘“The Inflation Tax in a Real 
Business Cycle Model." Amerícan Economíc Revíew 79 (No. 4 
1989): 733-48. 
Dixit. A. K.. and Stiglitz. J. E. “ Monopolistic Competition and 
Optimum Product Diversity." Amerícan Economic Revíezν 67 
(No. 3 1977): 297-308. 
Dornbusch. R. “ Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics." 
Joumal oJ Polítícal Economy 84 (No. 6 1976): 1161-76. 
Eichenbaum. M .. and Evans. C. “ Some Empirical Evidence on the 
E1Tects of Monetary Policy Shocks on the Exchange Rates." 
Mimeograph. FRB Chicago. December. 1993. 
Evans. M .. and 1ρthian. J. ‘“The Response of Exchange Rates to 
Permanent and Transitory Shocks under Floa디ng Exchange 
Rates." Mimeograph. Stern School of Business. April. 1993. 
458 SEOUL ]OURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
Fuerst. T. S. “ Liquidity. 1ρanable Funds and Real Ac디띠ty." Joumal 
oJ Monetary Economics 29 (No. 1 1992): 3-24. 
Grilli. V .. and Roubini. N. “Liquidi양 없ld Exchange Rates." Joumal 
oJ Intemational Economics 32 (No. 2 1992): 339-52. 
Hairault. J. 0 .. and Portier. F. “ Money. New-Keynesian Macroeco-
nomics and the Business Cycle." European Economic Review 
37 (No. 6 1993): 1533-68. 
King. R. G .. Plosser. C .. and Rebelo. S. T. “Production. Growth and 
Business Cycles: 1. The Basic Neoclassical Mode1." Joumal oJ 
Monetwν Economics 21 (Nos. 2-3 1988a): 195-232. 
“ Production. Growth and Business Cycles: 11. New 
Directions." Joumal oJ Monetary Economics 21 (Nos. 2-3 
1988b): 309-42. 
King. R. G.. 밍ld Watson ‘ M. W. “ Money. Prices. Interest Rates and 
the Business Cycle." Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Working Paper. 1995. 
Lucas. R. E .. J r.. and Stokey. N. L. “ Money Demand in the United 
State: A Quantitative Review." Came탱e-Rochester Conference 
Series on Public 21 (1 980): 137-67. 
---• “ Money and Interest in a Cash-in-Advance Economy." 
Econometrica 55 (1 987): 491-514. 
Lucas. R. E. Jr. “μquidity and Interest Rates." Joumal oJ Economic 
TheoTν 50 (1990): 237-64. 
Obstfeld. M .. and Rogoff. K. “ Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux." 
Joumal oJ Political Economy 103 (No. 3 1995): 624-60. 
•• • Foundations oJ Intemational Macroeconomics. Can1bridge: 
MIT Press. 1996. 
Rotemberg. J. J. “Prices and Output: An Empirical Analysis Based 
on a Sticky Price Model." Mimeograph. MIT. 1994. 
Rotemberg. J. J .. and Woodford. M. “Oligop이is디c Pricing and the 
Effects of Aggregate Demand on Economic Ac디vity." Joumal 
oJ Political Economy 100 (No. 5 1992): 1153-207. 
•• “ Dynan1ic General Equilibrium Models with Imperfectly 
Competitive Product Markets." Mimeograph. 1993. 
Schlagenhauf. D. E.. 밍ld Wrase. J. M. “Liquidity and Real Ac디써양 
in a Simple Open Economy Model." Mimeograph. Arizona 
State University. 1993. 
Stockman. A.. and Ohanian. L. E. “ Short-Run Independence of 
Monetary Policy under Pegged Exchange Rates and Effects of 
Money on Exchange Rates and Interest Rates." Mimeograph. 
STAlXERED PRlCE, EXCHANGE RATES AND MONETARY POLICY 459 
University of Rochester. 1993. 
s、rensson. Lars , E. 0 ., and W덴nbergen ， S. “ Excess Capacity. 
Monopolis디c Competition. and International Transmission ()f 
Monetaηr Disturbances." T l1e Economic Journal 99 (1989): 
78!;-805. 
Yun. T. “ Monetary Business Cycles and Price Set디ng under 
Monopolistic Competition. ,. Mimeograph. University ()f 
Chicago. 1994. 
